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Abstract
This paper uses firm-level data recorded in theAmadeus database to investigate the
distribution of labour productivity in different European countries. We find that the
upper tail of the empirical productivity distributions follows a decaying power-law,
whose exponent α is obtained by a semi-parametric estimation technique recently
developed by Clementi et al. (2006). The emergence of “fat tails” in productivity
distribution has already been detected in Di Matteo et al. (2005) and explained by
means of a model of social network. Here we show that this model is tested on a
broader sample of countries having different patterns of social network structure.
These different social attitudes, measured using a social capital indicator, reflect in
the power-law exponent estimates, verifying in this way the existence of linkages
among firms’ productivity performance and social network.
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1 Introduction
A consistent flow of research on firms’ and workers’ productivity regarding
the topic of technology innovation and diffusion has focused on generation
and transmission of innovations through networks of firms (Pittaway et al.,
2004), or on the relationship among social capital and productivity perfor-
mance (Cohen and Prusak, 2001) 1 . As highlighted in Di Matteo et al. (2005),
firms’ network plays a decisive role in the imitation process of the innovative
firms through which, according to the evolutionary literature perspective, in-
novations originally conceived by a given firm percolate outside it by imitation
from other firms. In this way the innovation flows through the network of con-
tacts and communications between firms. The significance of the underlying
connection network comes into sight when the collective dynamics of the sys-
tem is considered. As showed in several studies, above a certain threshold of
complexity, natural, artificial, and social systems are typically characterized
by networks with power-law degree distribution, i.e. “scale-free” networks (see
e.g. Albert and Baraba´si, 2002). In very recent times, network theory gained
momentum in explaining firms’ performance also from a technical perspective.
The amazingly rapid progress that took place in information technologies since
the mid of ’90s accounts for a noteworthy proportion of productivity growth.
Contemporarily, it also broadened the role of networks in determining firms’
labour productivity performances. The conjunct use of information networks
along supply or customer chains pushed toward a higher specialization and
improvement of skills in labour force and, in general, leaded to remarkable
changes in the competences needed within firms in order to maintain compet-
itiveness on the market (Motohashi, 2007).
In this paper we extend the analysis of the relationship among network and
productivity in two directions. First, we exploit the link between social capital,
social network and productivity distribution among firms. We do not limit
our analysis to the firms’ network (see e.g. Ahuja, 2000), but we embed it
in the study of social network characteristics, treating therefore also the non-
economic aspects that determine the social environment in which firms operate
and interact. According to Granovetter (2005), the social network influences
firms’ productivity through different channels: the mutual acceptance and the
prizing of technical skills inside the community of workers within a firm; the
control exerted among colleagues, that determines the quality of the effort
and, therefore, the efficiency of single workers in a way analogous to principal-
agent models; the interpersonal ties, inside and outside the firms, enforced by
repeated interaction, that lead to a level of trust that eases the interrelations
and the flow of information.
1 See Rogers (2003) for a comprehensive topic review.
2
The second aspect of novelty consists in the method of analysis. Indeed, the im-
pact of social network structure on productivity is quantitatively evaluated by
means of labour productivity distribution features, in order to verify whether
and to which extent social systems and social capital favor the circulation of in-
formation and innovation through networks of firms. The differences recorded
among firms’ productivity levels within a country determine the shape of pro-
ductivity distribution. As evidenced by Coleman (1988), stronger network ties
make the circulation of information faster and less expensive. This, in turn,
may reduce the gap in performances across firms by favoring the transmission
of knowledge and innovations, and thus leading to a more even distribution
of productivity among firms. Therefore, in this paper we investigate how dif-
ferences in social capital reflect into disparities in productivity distribution
shapes and parameters.
The study proceeds as follows: in Section 2, it is examined whether labour
productivity follows a power-law distribution in a sample of 9 European coun-
tries. This assessment is of particular interest, since the sample of countries
in object are not homogeneous from both an economic and a social point
of view. The presence of power-law tails in such different contexts might re-
veal that this emergence does not depend on a particular underlying social
structure, but it is consistent over different systems. The estimates of the
power-law exponent are here obtained by means of the technique introduced
by Clementi et al. (2006). This method adopts a subsample semi-parametric
bootstrap algorithm for optimally selecting the number of extreme quantiles
to be used in the upper tail estimation, and thus ending up with less am-
biguous estimates of the exponent α. Furthermore, we model the network of
firms along the lines of Di Matteo et al. (2005, but see also Di Matteo et al.,
2004): the use of this model allows to get a quantitative measure of the role of
the underlying network of firms in determining the shape of productivity dis-
tribution. According to this work, the emergence of “fat-tailed” distributions
may be interpreted as the outcome of an analogous structure of the network,
which must show slow decaying tails in its degree distribution, and, therefore,
a “scale-free” type behaviour 2 . In Section 3, the link between networks of
firms and social networks is illustrated by comparing the tail exponents of the
labour productivity distributions to a social capital indicator by country, and
also testing if social capital influences the aggregate growth of productivity.
Finally, Section 4 summarizes and concludes.
2 Pammolli and Riccaboni (2001) sustain this interpretation by detecting power-
law distributions in firms’ networks.
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2 Power-law decay in productivity distribution
Our aim here is to perform tail parameter estimations on labour productivity
data through a recently developed method. The labour productivity is defined
as added value over the amount of employees (where added value, defined
according to standard balance sheet reporting, is the difference between total
revenue and cost of inputs excluding the cost of labour). The results are used
in the remainder of this section to link our empirical findings to a model of
firms’ interaction across a complex network.
2.1 Data and methodology
In this paper we have used the Amadeus database, compiled by Bureau van
Dijk Electronic Publishing 3 . This data source contains firm-level data from
all over Europe, and is available in different sizes. Firms in this study are
taken from the “TOP 250,000 Module”, including companies that fulfill one of
three criteria regarding the magnitude of operating revenues, total assets and
the number of employees 4 . The analysis is based on 10 years of data (1996–
2005) for 9 countries (Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands,
Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom); for some of them (Germany and
Italy) we have also used data by geographical sub-areas (East/West Germany
and North/South Italy, respectively). The number of observations for each
year and country is shown in Table 1. It should be noted that the number of
companies for all countries is lower in 1996 and 2005 compared to all other
years in the time span. Therefore, results from these years should be used with
caution, since they might not be completely reliable.
From these data we have calculated the empirical complementary cumulative
distributions (P≥ (x), being the probability to find a firm with productivity
larger than or equal to x), which show a very clear linear trend for large values
of x in a log-log scale, implying a non-Gaussian character with the probability
for large productivities well described by a power-law behaviour, i.e. P≥ (x) ∼
x−α. To extract the value of α we have used Clementi et al.’s (2006) subsample
semi-parametric bootstrap algorithm for data-driven selection of the number
of observations located in the tail of the distribution. This technique relies on
the popular Hill’s (1975) maximum likelihood estimator for the tail index α,
3 Further details on the database can be found on the provider website:
http://www.bvdep.com/en/amadeus.html.
4 For France, Germany, Italy, Russia, Spain, the United Kingdom and Ukraine, the
inclusion thresholds are e 15 million in operating revenues, e 30 million in assets
and 200 employees. For all the other countries, they are e 10 million in operating
revenues, e 20 million in assets and 150 employees.
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Table 1. The number of companies from 1996 to 2005 onAmadeus database (Bureau Van Dijk) in the following countries and geographical
sub-areas: Belgium (BEL), Finland (FIN), France (FRA), Germany (GER), East Germany (EASTGER), West Germany (WESTGER),
Italy (ITA), North Italy (NORTHITA), South Italy (SOUTHITA), Netherlands (NET), Spain (SPA), Sweden (SWE) and the United
Kingdom (UK).
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
BEL 4,205 4,396 4,733 5,076 5,378 5,698 6,104 6,240 6,258 1,314
FIN 981 1,432 1,416 1,752 1,901 2,030 2,283 2,470 2,451 1,255
FRA 9,239 10,745 12,450 13,045 13,570 14,204 15,468 15,911 17,855 3,037
GER 1,453 1,497 1,656 1,661 1,961 2,126 3,807 4,404 4,278 751
EASTGER 186 192 233 246 274 269 512 583 599 107
WESTGER 1,267 1,305 1,423 1,415 1,687 1,857 3,295 3,821 3,679 644
ITA 10,904 11,861 12,087 13,742 14,360 14,995 16,492 13,574 16,715 3,586
NORTHITA 7,945 8,604 8,845 9,956 10,312 10,682 11,834 10,292 12,037 3,011
SOUTHITA 2,949 3,257 3,242 3,786 4,048 4,313 4,658 3,282 4,678 575
NET 1,404 1,643 1,884 2,685 2,616 3,221 3,961 4,112 3,825 807
SPA 6,551 7,382 8,356 9,020 10,123 11,378 12,472 12,736 12,300 228
SWE n.a.a 2,437 3,674 5,815 6,387 6,855 7,278 7,517 7,728 2,768
UK 4,205 10,563 11,578 12,545 13,679 15,082 16,482 17,342 17,687 5,996
a n.a. = Data not available.
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given by
αn =
{
1
m
m∑
i=1
[
log x(n−i+1) − log x(n−m)
]}−1
, (1)
where n is the sample size, m the number of observations in the tail of
the distribution and the sample elements are put in descending order, i.e.
x(n) ≥ x(n−1) ≥ · · · ≥ x(n−m) ≥ · · · ≥ x(1). As well known, the main problem
connected with the Hill’s estimator is the decision about an appropriate tail
size, i.e. the optimal number of observations m included in the calculation
of αn. This choice is accomplished by the authors through minimisation of
the finite-sample Mean Squared Error (MSE) of the estimator (1), so that an
optimal m is defined by
m∗ = argmin
m
E
[(
α#
n1
− αn
)2]
,
where αn is an initial estimate from the original sample and α
#
n1
is the estimate
obtained using the bootstrapped datasets drawn from a smoothed paramet-
ric distribution of n1 ≤ n observations belonging to the null hypothesis of a
complete sequence of goodness-of-fit tests for Pareto-type tail behaviour. The
number of bootstrap replications is automatically chosen according to a three-
step procedure to achieve the desired level of accuracy, where accuracy is mea-
sured by the percentage deviation of the estimate obtained by running a finite
number of bootstrap repetitions from the corresponding ideal bootstrap quan-
tity estimated with an infinite number of resamples (Andrews and Buchinsky,
2000). Since MSE comprises the variance and bias of the estimator, the optimal
estimate α∗
n
—making use of m∗ observations lying in the tail—will be in this
way a balance between the former (which usually decreases with increasing
tail size) and the latter (which tends to increase with tail size) 5 . Inspection of
the results reveals slight differences among years and countries: for example,
for some countries (Belgium, West Germany, Sweden and the United King-
dom) we observe relatively homogeneous entries for the tail indices, while for
other countries (Finland, France, East Germany and Spain) the estimate of α
has a tendency to decrease in time; exceptions to these temporal patterns are
Germany, Italy, North and South Italy and Netherlands, for which the value
of α shows a sharp decrease around the beginning of the current decade. How-
ever, the time interval under investigation is too short to decide whether these
differences are due to major economic and/or political-institutional changes
5 Hill himself devised a data-analytic method for choosing m∗ which is based on
sequentially testing appropriate functions of the observations for exponentiality.
However, the application of this procedure to our productivity data resulted in
overestimation of the tail exponent compared to the semi-parametric bootstrap
algorithm. This appears to empirically support Hall and Welsh’s (1985) argument
of a very gradual deterioration of the exponential approximation, leading Hill’s
method to largely overestimate m (and thus α by Eq. (1)).
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Table 2. Estimates of the power-law tail exponent α by subsample semi-parametric resampling and 95% confidence intervalsa. The data
used are taken from the Amadeus database by Bureau Van Dijk, and the countries, years and sample sizes considered are those listed
in Table 1.
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
BEL 0.99±0.06 0.97±0.06 0.93±0.06 0.93±0.06 0.86±0.06 0.95±0.06 0.97±0.07 0.89±0.06 0.91±0.06 0.92±0.11
FIN 1.25±0.28 1.45±0.19 1.49±0.16 1.40±0.16 1.21±0.12 1.26±0.12 0.94±0.16 0.99±0.12 0.99±0.19 0.83±0.15
FRA 0.92±0.10 1.02±0.11 0.76±0.07 0.85±0.07 0.73±0.05 0.69±0.04 0.66±0.03 0.64±0.03 0.74±0.05 0.55±0.08
GER 1.53±0.13 1.44±0.09 1.59±0.09 1.48±0.09 1.45±0.11 1.41±0.10 1.05±0.18 0.94±0.13 1.43±0.08 1.30±0.22
EASTGER 1.44±0.16 1.33±0.22 1.34±0.20 1.30±0.19 1.15±0.16 1.45±0.25 1.28±0.14 1.15±0.11 1.19±0.14 0.86±0.17
WESTGER 1.38±0.15 1.40±0.09 1.52±0.14 1.46±0.10 1.36±0.11 1.40±0.12 1.35±0.10 1.16±0.12 1.35±0.11 1.21±0.26
ITA 1.43±0.15 1.47±0.17 1.42±0.10 1.34±0.08 1.02±0.06 1.13±0.09 0.87±0.06 1.16±0.08 1.04±0.07 1.09±0.09
NORTHITA 1.37±0.23 1.38±0.23 1.49±0.13 1.31±0.09 0.96±0.07 1.19±0.12 0.83±0.07 1.38±0.09 1.12±0.07 1.11±0.10
SOUTHITA 1.13±0.17 1.84±0.10 1.83±0.10 1.58±0.08 1.16±0.10 1.10±0.13 0.99±0.10 1.17±0.09 1.06±0.09 1.07±0.17
NET 1.58±0.18 1.38±0.15 1.61±0.14 0.83±0.14 0.97±0.11 0.64±0.06 0.62±0.06 0.65±0.06 0.99±0.08 0.96±0.15
SPA 1.10±0.10 1.19±0.09 1.17±0.07 1.04±0.06 0.97±0.05 0.90±0.04 0.85±0.04 0.78±0.03 0.74±0.03 0.98±0.27
SWE n.a. 1.17±0.08 0.98±0.05 1.05±0.06 0.97±0.06 1.00±0.07 1.05±0.07 1.04±0.05 0.97±0.05 1.12±0.08
UK 0.99±0.07 0.97±0.07 0.93±0.07 0.96±0.07 0.93±0.07 0.96±0.05 0.97±0.05 0.96±0.05 0.93±0.05 0.94±0.07
a The 95% confidence intervals around the point estimates are given by α± f95%
α√
m
, where f95% is the 95% point of the normal
distribution.
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which could have led to a change of the extremal part of the distributions 6 .
2.2 Power-law-tailed distributions in firms’ interaction networks
Di Matteo et al. (2005) have provided a simple model of technological change
through a social network of interactions between firms to explain the occur-
rence of power-law tails in the empirically observed productivity distributions.
The general idea behind this work is that a productivity-increasing technologi-
cal innovation, originally introduced and adopted by a certain firm, can spread
over time to other firms by imitation if they interact through a “scale-free”
type network with degree distribution given by p (k) ∼ k−(α+1). The model
predicts that the aggregate distribution for the productivity of the ensemble
of firms is given by a normalized sum of Gaussians with averages distributed
according with the connectivity in the network of interactions among firms.
Therefore, it is the special structure of the underlying network, having slow de-
caying tails in its degree distribution, which shapes the aggregate productivity
distribution. This theoretical prediction results in good quantitative agreement
with the empirical results for the productivity distribution in France and Italy
in the years 1996–2001 based on the “TOP 1.5 million Module” of Amadeus
database 7 .
Here we extend the analysis to actual empirical evidence coming from our
dataset of firms fulfilling the “TOP 250,000 Module” inclusion criteria. Figs.
1 and 2 show the log-log plot of the complementary cumulative distributions
of labour productivity corresponding to the years 1996–2005 for two differ-
6 For a more in-depth investigation of the tail behaviour, we have also fitted our
data to the α-stable distribution using the program Stable (Nolan, 1997, 1999a,b,
2001), available from J. P. Nolan’s website: academic2.american.edu/~jpnolan.
We noticed that only in a small number of cases the 95% confidence intervals of the
semi-parametric tail index estimates extend to the realm of stable laws, and that in
a more limited number of cases the tail index estimates calculated from the stable
model are in a somewhat close accordance with the semi-parametric ones. But this
is to be expected, since semi-parametric tail index estimation provides a tight fit
of the distribution outer parts, whereas the stable law parameters are selected to
approximate the entire shape of the empirical distribution (DuMouchel, 1983; Lux,
1996).
7 In the “TOP 1.5 million Module”, British, French, German, Italian, Russian,
Spanish and Ukrainian companies are included if they satisfy at least one of the
following criteria: operating revenues bigger than 1.5 million e; total assets bigger
than 3 million e; number of employees bigger than 20. For all other countries,
companies are included if their operation revenue is bigger than 1 million e, or
total assets are bigger than 2 million e, or the number of employees is bigger than
15.
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Fig. 1. Complementary cumulative distributions for the labour productivity in Bel-
gium over the years 1996–2005. The theoretical behaviour (black solid line) is for
α = 1.84, m = 33, n = 20, σ = 16 and β = 0.5.
ent countries: Belgium and the United Kingdom 8 . We find a quantitatively
good agreement by considering an underlying scale-free network with degree
distribution given by p (k) ∝ k−(α+1) exp (−β/k), averages k(1)
l
= m + zln di-
rectly proportional to the number of connections zl that each firm l has in the
network, and variance equal to σ. We note that, although there are several
parameters to calibrate, the tail behaviour of the theoretical distribution is
controlled only by the power-law exponent α, while in the small and medium
ranges the other parameters have a larger influence. From our analysis we
observe that the theoretical curves (drawn as solid lines) fit well the empirical
findings with α = 0.84, m = 33, n = 20, σ = 16 and β = 0.5 for Belgium, and
α = 0.88, m = 24, n = 11, σ = 16 and β = 0.6 for the United Kingdom. Very
good levels of agreement (not shown here but available upon request) have also
been obtained for the other countries considered in our study; the parameters
used for the theoretical curves are shown in Table 3. Notice that, although
there is still matching between the theoretical predictions and the empirical
findings, the numerical values we need to theoretically approximate the shape
of the East German empirical distributions in an appropriate way are some-
8 Productivity data have been deflated by using the implicit GDP deflator (2000 =
100) taken from the OECD Statistics Portal (www.oecd.org/statistics/).
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Fig. 2. Complementary cumulative distributions for the labour productivity in the
United Kingdom over the years 1996–2005. The theoretical behaviour (black solid
line) is for α = 1.88, m = 24, n = 11, σ = 16 and β = 0.6.
what different from those of the other countries. This might be due to the
limited number of entries this geographical area accounts for over the entire
period of investigation, which shapes the productivity distributions differently
than the others, especially in their outer parts.
3 Social network, social capital and economic performance
A huge literature focuses on the relationship among social capital and produc-
tivity of economic units or organizations (see Cohen and Prusak, 2001, among
others). In particular, some authors (e.g. Fukuyama, 2000) tend to put em-
phasis on qualitative aspects of the relationship network-capital, drawing the
attention to the capability of social capital within developed societies of linking
heterogeneous social networks and improving communication and information
flows. Along these lines, our aim here is to investigate whether social capital
plays a role in the transfer of knowledge, information, and technology through
the social network of firms in a country (on this point see in particular Ahuja,
2000). The basic hypothesis is that a higher level of social capital improves
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Table 3
Model parameters used to draw the theoretical curves for all countries and geo-
graphical sub-areas.
α m n σ β
BEL 0.8 33 20 16 0.5
FIN 1 30 14 12 0.5
FRA 0.7 30 10 12 0.3
GER 1 36 15 18 0.9
EASTGER 1.3 10 6 8 10
WESTGER 1.1 35 18 16 1
ITA 1.1 32 13 18 1.5
NORTHITA 1.2 28 19 16 1
SOUTHITA 1.1 23 19 16 1
NET 0.8 34 14 16 0.6
SPA 0.8 21 13 18 0.2
SWE 0.9 30 7 12 1.5
UK 0.9 24 11 16 0.6
the efficacy of social network linkages, favoring and strengthening connec-
tions among agents, and lowering costs and time of communication (Coleman,
1988). In terms of the present study, a more effective social network reduces
the relative distances among firms’ productivity levels, since innovation and
technological information flow more rapidly and with lower costs (Granovetter,
1985). Firms’ productivity, therefore, results more evenly distributed, and the
power-law exponents increase. The verification of this hypothesis introduces
an original way to investigate the relation among social capital of a country
and economic performance at aggregate level, since countries with different
levels of social capital should display as well a different power-law exponent
in labour productivity distribution.
By social capital we mean the ‘features of social life-networks, norms, and
trust, that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared
objectives’ (Putnam, 1995, pp. 664–665). This definition supports the choice of
performing a country-level analysis, since a nation is supposed to represent a
homogeneous sample as regards social network and institutional aspects. The
concept of social capital was firstly introduced in sociology with reference to
groups or communities. The extension of the concept at the country level, op-
erated by political scientists, has been initially subject to critics, especially as
regards measurement and distinction among human and social capital (Solow,
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1995). In more recent years, some of the cited studies performed at country
(Coleman, 1988) and sub-country level (e.g. Di Giacinto and Nuzzo, 2006)
demonstrated the usefulness of the concept of social capital, in particular for
investigating social network features. Besides, Putnam (2000) stresses the rel-
evance of social capital in improving the performance of individuals, since it
puts them in a connected network. Indeed, social networks are often identified
by specialized literature as the “structure” of social capital (e.g. Burt, 2000),
concept that is well specified by Bourdieu (1996, p. 249): ‘The volume of social
capital possessed by a given agent [. . . ] depends on the size of the network of
connections that he can effectively mobilize’. In order to obtain a synthetic
indicator, empirical analyses usually adopt international surveys. Along the
lines of most of these works, we employ the World Values Survey (WVS ), a
data source designed to enable a cross-national/cross-cultural comparison of
values and norms in a wide variety of areas, and to monitor changes in values
and attitudes in societies all over the world 9 . In particular, we refer to the
latest available wave of the WVS by adopting as a social capital measure the
trust, quantified by the percentage of interviewed people who agree to the as-
sertion that “most people can be trusted” 10 . According to Knack and Keefer
(1997) and Sabatini (2006), among others, this quantity is likely to be deeply
related with economic and productivity performances 11 . Moreover, the use of
this proxy permits to avoid Portes’ (1998) critic, according to which the isola-
tion of social capital’s definition from its effects would be ambiguous and, with
particular reference to trust, could be reduced to the result of the effectiveness
of legal enforcement in a country’s system (Guiso et al., 2004). This linkage
among social capital and legal enforcement in the WVS is better captured by
the variable civic, which concerns a series of social behaviors (such as “avoid-
ing a fare on public transport”) that can be never, partially or totally justified
by the interviewed persons (see Knack and Keefer, 1997, for a more detailed
explanation and an investigation of the relationship among civic and trust).
Nevertheless, the measure of interpersonal trust reported in the WVS appears
to be consistent with its definition as an equilibrium outcome of a society
where non-legal mechanisms force people to behave cooperatively (Coleman,
1990).
On Fig. 3 we plot α¯, the average of the power-law exponent estimates for
9 To date, the World Values Survey has carried out four waves (1981–1984,
1989–1993, 1994–1999, and 1999–2004) of national surveys representative of
the values and beliefs in more than 80 countries on all six inhabited con-
tinents. The data are available for free download from the project website:
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/.
10 The exact question in the WVS is: “Generally speaking, would you say that most
people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?”.
11 In order to avoid biases due to the oversampling of certain categories of people
interviewed, all the answers to these questions have been pondered by the weights
provided in the survey itself.
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Fig. 3. Error bar plot of the average tail index estimate against the WVS-based
trust measure. The length of each error bar equals two times the standard error of
the mean. The black solid line is the ordinary least squares (OLS) fit to the data
with 95% prediction bounds (PB).
each country over the period under investigation, as a function of the level
of trust; the corresponding values are shown in Table 4 12 . By observing
the graph, one can notice that a tendency toward a positive trend seems to
emerge between the average value of the estimates of power-law exponents
and the level of trust. However, given the low number of cases included in
the analysis, it is not possible to infer any further conclusions. Nonetheless,
some deviations from this trend are present. In particular, the calculated value
12Due to the reduced number of observations, which might bias the results for some
countries, we exclude the tail index estimates for 2005 from the computation of the
mean for countries with less than 1000 observations in that year (namely, Germany,
West Germany, South Italy, Netherlands and Spain). As regards East Germany, the
mean is computed considering all values, since anyway the number of observations
is always less than 1000. Notice that the choice to use the average value of the
estimates permits to smooth temporary variations (that in some countries—e.g.
Germany, Italy and Netherlands—are not negligible), and it is likely to be more
appropriate to enable comparison with the wave of WVS data we use, since this
data collection was undertaken in the central years of the period under analysis for
firms.
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Table 4
Temporal averages of the power-law exponent estimates (α¯) over the period under
investigation and percentage level of trust (WVS, 1999-2004 wave) for each country
and geographical sub-area considered in the study. Also shown is the estimated
standard error of the mean.
α¯ Trust (%)
BEL 0.93±0.03 31.30
FRA 1.18±0.17 59.30
FIN 0.76±0.10 22.80
GER 1.37±0.17a 34.10
EASTGER 1.29±0.09 48.30
WESTGER 1.36±0.08a 40.70
ITA 1.20±0.15 32.20
NORTHITA 1.23±0.17 n.a.
SOUTHITA 1.32±0.26a n.a.
NET 1.03±0.31a 52.60
SPA 0.97±0.13a 33.20
SWE 1.04±0.05b 63.20
UK 0.96±0.02 39.50
a Excluding 2005.
b Excluding 1996.
of the linear (Pearson’s) correlation coefficient between these two variables is
0.28, with an estimated p-value for testing the hypothesis of no correlation
equal to 0.46; however, once Germany and Italy have been excluded from
the calculation, the estimated correlation coefficient and p-value are 0.86 and
0.01, respectively. These results are confirmed if one uses Kendall’s τ and
Spearman’s ρ as more general and robust measures of dependence, obtaining
τ = 0.39 (p-value = 0.18) and ρ = 0.47 (p-value = 0.21) when the two coun-
tries are included in the analysis, and τ = 0.81 (p-value = 0.01) and ρ = 0.93
(p-value = 0.01) when they are not. The positive but significant (at the 5%
significance level) correlation only once Germany and Italy are excluded from
the computation points to an outlying behaviour of these countries, which
indeed reveal an average value of the power-law exponent significantly higher
compared to the other countries. A possible explanation of this behaviour
involves the particular heterogeneity within each country. The aggregates of
these two countries are actually the sum of two different social networks and
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economic systems: East and West for Germany, North and South for Italy 13 .
The average values of the tail index estimations for the above-mentioned lev-
els of geographical disaggregation is shown in the second column of Table
4. As regards Germany, the value of trust is somewhat bigger in the East-
ern part (48.3% against 40.7% of the West), but it should be noted that at
the beginning of the period under observation for firms the percentages of
trust were 24.3 for the East and 39.9 for the West, respectively (1997 WVS
data) 14 . During this time, firms in East Germany were catching up Western
ones: the aggregate labour productivity of East Germany (as a percentage of
the West Germany’s level) progresses from 45% in 1990 to approximatively
70% in 2002 (Uhlig, 2006); simultaneously, the power-law exponent estimates
of the Eastern firms’ productivity distribution results lower at the end of the
period of observation with respect to the beginning, while they remain sub-
stantially stable in West Germany 15 . If considered togheter, these matters
suggest that the improvement in Eastern workers’ productivity has been ac-
companied by a relevant integration of the different social networks and an
increase of the differences between firms in the initially disadvantaged area.
Therefore, a Schumpeterian mechanism seems to be at work here: not all firms
took advantage from the new body of technologies and information available.
In particular, the augmented level of social trust did not determine a gen-
eralized improvement in firms’ productivity due to the massive migration of
workers towards the West and, consequently, the difficulties for Eastern firms
in hiring skilled workers. According to Cooper (1999) 16 , this networking prob-
lem is at the root of the slowdown in the catching-up process observed after
2002. In other words, over a certain starting threshold of heterogeneity, even
a remarkable improvement in social capital has limited or no effect on the
network structure, the communication among weakly connected points being
problematic (the “structural holes” proposed by Burt). As regards Italy, given
the unavailability of geographical sub-area survey data, no definitive conclu-
sions can be drawn from the disaggregation analysis, even though the average
level of power-law exponent for Northern firms is slightly lower.
13 See Vecernik (2003) for Germany and Di Giacinto and Nuzzo (2006) for Italy.
14 These results do not differ greatly from the values of immediate pre-unification
period. Indeed, East and West Germany’s 1990 WVS percent levels of trust equalled
to 20.1 and 31.1, respectively.
15 A word of caution is needed here due to the low number of observations for East
Germany.
16 But see also Rosenfeld et al. (2004) on the related question of “clusterization” of
Eastern firms.
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4 Conclusions
In this work we have detected the emergence of power-law tails in labour
productivity distributions for 9 European countries and different time periods.
We have modeled the empirical labour productivity distributions with the
model introduced by Di Matteo et al. (2005), and compared its outcomes with
the empirical power-law exponents estimated by means of Clementi et al.’s
(2006) algorithm. The model has been validated for all cases, confirming that
power-law tails can emerge from scale-free contact-networks. Moreover, we
have investigated the relationship between productivity distribution features
and social trust, evidencing a tendency toward a positive relationship between
the mean values of the power-law exponents of labour productivity and the
level of trust. However, the data appear scattered and, because of the reduced
number of points, it is not possible to draw a definitive conclusion.
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